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Challenging the Strength of the Anti-Mercenary Norm 
Christopher Kinsey & Hin-Yan Liu 
Abstract 
This article questions the prevailing view that a strong international norm exists against 
mercenary activity. We argue that more consideration needs to be given to international 
restrictions placed upon mercenaries that are the tangential expressions of more basic and 
pervasive international norms, namely those of state neutrality, the right of peoples to self-
determination, and freedom of movement. To buttress our claim, we draw upon documentary 
evidence during the moments critical to the norm’s growth; the Napoleonic Wars-1840, the 
Crimean War, and conflicts of national liberation in the de-colonisation era. The evidence 
suggests a broad indifference to mercenaries among policy makers during these critical 
periods. We conclude that the anti-mercenary norm is not as strong as its supporters suggest 
and is often marginalised when national interests dictate.  
Introduction 
Permeating the literature on mercenarism is the contention that the modern decline of 
mercenary activities is attributable to the development of a strong anti-mercenary norm at the 
international level (Percy 2007a; Percy 2007b; Percy 2014).1 Implicit within this perspective 
is that mercenary opprobrium was generated by States, which restrict mercenary activity on 
the basis of moral objections. In particular, Percy (2007b, 121) claims that;   
 The norm against mercenary use, in particular the argument that mercenaries are 
 morally undesirable because they do not fight for an appropriate cause, is crucial to 
 understand why states abandoned the use of foreign soldiers and took a great leap of 
 faith in opting for citizen armies. As the concept of citizen duty to the state grew, and 
 as patriotism and nationalism became increasingly seen as desirable and practical for 
 armies, a selfish and financial motivation became morally inappropriate and 
 practically inferior.2 (Emphasis added) 
In making the argument that the modern decline of mercenarism was propelled by a change 
in the normative environment, Percy highlights this moral objection as reflecting upon the 
identity and civility of the State (Percy 2007b, 121–23). Thus, her normative claim 
emphasises the overlapping moral shifts in the relationship between citizens and the State that 
together crowded mercenaries out of the armies of civilised nations (Percy 2007b, 165–66).  
While we accept that the modern decline of mercenary activity was underpinned by a degree 
of moral reasoning, we argue that Percy has overstated its importance and overlooked the 
                                                 
1 A ‘strong norm’ is more than just a matter of degree (strong or weak norm). Nor is it merely an adjective 
moderating ‘norm’, but is categorically different than simply ‘strong’ and ‘norm’. It is unclear, however, what 
Percy means because she does not define ‘strong norm’. She describes a ‘strong norm’ as a prohibitionary norm, 
but ascribe characteristics that set it apart from other weak/average norms. This indeterminacy makes it difficult 
to directly engage with her position.  
2 Percy conflates the purposes for which one fights (such as material gain) with the cause that one fights for 
(such as self-determination). The distinction is critical because one might fight for a just cause but for 
inappropriate purposes and vice versa. See Lynch and Walsh 2000. A different way of approaching this is that it 
is not evident that mercenaries should be phased out as a means of pursuing warfare because of shifting reasons 
to go to war.  
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impact of confluent international norms on mercenary decline.3 We dispute that an anti-
mercenary norm grew from only, or even predominantly, moral objections to the mercenary. 
We garner support for our claims from recently unearthed evidence that casts light upon 
different State motivations underpinning the transition away from mercenary armies. Our 
evidence is more consistent with Janice Thomson’s claim that the decline of mercenarism 
resulted from the countervailing international norm that States should control non-State 
violence (Thomson 1990; Thomson 1994). While Percy rightly recognises the limitations of 
Thomson’s argument that restrictions imposed on the supply of foreign military actors need 
not result in the suppression of the mercenarism phenomenon (Percy 2007b, 112–19), 
Thomson’s logic excavates only one aspect of the argument we offer here. We present two 
complementary international norms; neutrality and the right of peoples to self-determination 
which also impacted mercenarism practices.  
More concretely, while we accept an observable decline of mercenary activity during the 
modern era, we question suggestions that a specific international norm has crystallised 
against mercenarism per se. The historical record indicates two diverging impulses 
undergirding State initiatives to restrict mercenary activities that have been conflated by 
arguments about an anti-mercenary norm. In the first, States are seeking to limit the exodus 
of their citizens to participate in foreign armed conflicts through neutrality laws (European 
mercenaries in the 19th Century). In the second, States are attempting to curtail the influx of 
foreign military actors meddling with their internal affairs with appeal to the right of peoples 
to self-determination (mercenaries in the Congo and Angola). As support, we present archival 
evidence and consider formal regulation: with the expectation is that States would not seek to 
elevate minor or parochial concerns to the international plane, the latter may indicate the 
perceived seriousness or the level of generalisability of the issue facing the State.4 
Dividing State responses to mercenarism highlights the fundamentally different interests that 
States were pursuing in efforts that restricted mercenarism. States supplying mercenaries 
objected to the practice on significantly different grounds than those in which mercenaries 
were operating. The divergence of State interests behind these efforts challenges the 
perceived unity of the international community in castigating mercenarism as morally 
repugnant. Thus, even if the international community were in unison in reprimanding 
mercenarism, this difference in their underlying rationale undermines the possibility of a 
unified moral objection.  
We focus particularly on the periods covered by the Foreign Enlistment Bill (1819) to the 
Enlistment of Foreigners Bill (1854), and the period of African decolonisation. As Riemann 
has argued, the mercenary himself has been treated as a trans-historical figure even though 
the anti-mercenary norm is seen as socially constructed (Riemann 2016, 170). To limit the 
incongruity between treating the anti-mercenary norm as a social construct and the mercenary 
as an actor as an implicitly stable figure despite fluctuating historical circumstances, we focus 
                                                 
3 Even with the strong formulation of the moral objections, Percy’s quote above remains infused with 
instrumental reasoning; that citizen service was perceived as both being more efficient for States as well as 
being practically superior in the field. 
4 In the case of the UK government, it was thought the mercenary problem was a Congolese issue and therefore 




on the period after citizen armies had consolidated and cast mercenaries into their modern 
characterization.  
If Percy is correct, the nature and strength of political responses against the use of 
mercenaries should have become firmly entrenched in European thought in the aftermath of 
the French and American Revolutions.5 The periods we examine should be expected to 
uncover staunch political opposition and international outcry at the use of mercenaries but 
they do not. Instead, we find that in the period starting immediately after the Napoleonic 
Wars to the end of the first Carlist War in 1840 there was considerable mercenary activity in 
Southern Europe and South America which was unofficially supported by the governments of 
the United Kingdom and France (Rodriguez 2009; Rodriguez 2006). This activity did not 
generate the moral outrage that Percy might have expected, but instead concerns neutrality 
and the right of peoples to self-determination.  
Indeed, anti-mercenarism results from competing logics in each of the periods we examine.  
Using empirical evidence from Hansard records of UK parliamentary debates surrounding 
19th century foreign enlistment legislation, along with declassified official UK documentation 
covering mercenary activity in the Middle East and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. While 
the United Kingdom was concerned about the moral hazards attached to the hiring of 
mercenaries, the evidence shows that these moral concerns were never sufficiently strong to 
prevent mercenary activity per se. Instead, the international norms of state neutrality and the 
right of peoples to self-determination played significant roles in restricting mercenary activity 
during these periods.  
Framing the Theoretical Approaches 
Mercenarism cannot usefully be analysed as a monolithic phenomenon, and to imbue it with 
features of stability and universality is to misunderstand its fluid and adaptive nature. As we 
discuss below, a significant factor that undermines the notion of a strong anti-mercenary 
norm is that it overlooks the different manifestations and diverging objectives of mercenary 
activity. Mercenarism is merely an instrument often utilised by political elites, as in the case 
of the Yemeni mercenaries (Jones 2004), or by governments, typified by the CIA’s 
employment of mercenaries in the Congo. As such, it is evaluated according to its suitability 
and effectiveness for the relevant task (Michaels 2012).6 Viewed from this perspective, 
assessing the merits and demerits of mercenarism in isolation will be unhelpful in 
understanding its characteristics, and misleading as to the conclusions drawn. 
Instead, we propose that analyses of mercenarism need to be undertaken within the broader 
normative context, accounting for the content, direction and objective of other international 
norms and their relationship to the type of mercenary activity in question. The relevant 
international norms intersecting with mercenary activity are; the freedom of movement,7 the 
principle of non-intervention,8 and the right of peoples to self-determination.9 We argue that 
                                                 
5 We owe this point to Malte Riemann.  
6 Michaels argues that US policymakers were content to support a mercenary operation, considered as the best 
option to defeat the insurgency.   
7 Enshrined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR), and Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (henceforth ICCPR), UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966.  
8 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, 24 October 1970. 
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perceived restrictions to mercenary activity are only the tangential effects of these other 
international norms, and thus suggest that the form and intensity of the reaction to 
mercenarism can be predicted by the effect of these norms (Rosén 2008, 86-90), without 
recourse to a specific anti-mercenary norm.  
We posit two axes along which regulation can be plotted to structure the challenge against the 
notion of an integrated and targeted international norm against mercenarism. First is the 
relative position of the regulator State; is the State seeking to curtail the outflow of its 
citizens, or is the State attempting to prevent foreign military actors from interfering in its 
internal affairs? Second is the formal level of the regulation; does the regulator State desire to 
govern for itself domestically, or is the aim to influence the international community?  
It is important to distinguish between these impulses because their underlying interests 
diverge significantly. The primary concern of a State seeking to maintain its neutrality in 
relation to a foreign conflict is to prevent becoming embroiled in it, while the main aim of a 
State seeking to limit foreign interference is instead to deter and punish transgressors.   
Normative Restrictions imposed upon sending-States 
In Corfu Channel, the ICJ recognised as a ‘general and well-recognised principle (…) every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights 
of other States’ (ICJ 1949, 22).10 This obligation suggests that States should undertake 
actions to curtail the outflow of private military actors from its territory, provided that such 
activities would threaten the rights of other States. The position of the ICJ, however, cannot 
be construed to suggest that mercenarism would be internationally unlawful per se, precisely 
because of the qualifier that the relevant acts are those that operate against the rights of other 
States. Similarly, while ‘[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State’ fall 
within the international legal definition of aggression,11 it does not follow that all outflows of 
private military actors fall within this definition. The definition of aggression hinges upon 
two qualifiers; that the State possess agency and direction with regard to the forces which are 
sent by the State and that the acts of armed force are deployed against another State.12  
Two inferences can be drawn; first that a simple nexus between a State or its territory and the 
outflow of private military actors does not necessarily contravene international law; and 
                                                                                                                                                        
The International Court of Justice (henceforth ICJ) held that; ‘The principle of non-intervention involves the 
right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference… the Court considers that it is 
part and parcel of customary international law’, (ICJ 1986, para. 202). The ICJ has since reaffirmed this position 
(ICJ 2005). 
9 Article 1(1) common to the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(henceforth ICESCR), General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966. 
10 Article 1 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UNGAR 2002) provides that 
‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State’. The 
International Law Commission cites Corfu Channel as a leading ICJ case establishing the principle (ILC 2007, 
II, Part II:32). 
11 Article 3(g), Definition of Aggression, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 
December 1974, incorporated verbatim into Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, RC/Res.6, 11 June 2010 defining the international crime of aggression.  
12 While Corfu Channel does not have a sending requirement, it compensates by having a lesser threshold in 
stipulating ‘acts contrary to the rights of other States’ which appear to include action falling short of armed 
attack, and also by providing a knowledge standard. 
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second that even if one State is organising, directing or sending private forces to another 
State, that this is not necessarily repugnant to international law because those forces may not 
be deployed against or otherwise in a detrimental fashion to that state.13 Hague V is 
instructive on the first point, where Article 4 stipulates that ‘Corps of combatants cannot be 
formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the 
belligerents’.14 This codification implies that a State’s neutral status would be unaffected 
where individuals leave on their own accord for foreign military service: the impugned 
actions are only those in which the State organises or assists in the formation of military units 
for foreign wars. The most obvious example of the second point is that an exodus of armed 
personnel which leaves one State in order to participate in the self-defence of another State is 
not obviously unlawful under international law. A strong and unified norm against mercenary 
activity exists would suggest that even such activity would be internationally objectionable. 
Instead, the operative principle here is that of non-interference, and restrictions imposed upon 
nominally non-State actors function to prevent the inter-State violence through private proxy.  
Converging with this position are the national neutrality laws which are often cited as 
evidence of an anti-mercenary norm.15 As the nomenclature suggests, these are pieces of 
domestic legislation enacted to maintain the neutrality of a State with regard to armed 
conflicts of which it is not a party. First instigated by the United States in the form of the 
1794 Neutrality Act, it was subsequently mimicked by other States and thus globalised 
(Lobel 1983, 2. For the subsequent transnational spread of “neutrality acts”, see Thomson 
1994, 79–84. See generally, Layeb 1989). Transplanting such legislation into the 
mercenarism context, Janice Thomson (1994, 55) identified the essential question as to 
whether a State could retain a credible claim to neutrality when nominally private individuals 
leave its territory to participate in foreign conflicts. In a nutshell, is the mercenary to be 
understood as a political actor who engages the international responsibility of the State? We 
suggest that the development and proliferation of domestic neutrality laws serves primarily to 
limit State responsibility for private military actors leaving their territory, and that restrictions 
to their movement are incidental to this core objective of insulating the State from foreign 
conflicts. Furthermore, the popularity of such legislation is indicative of States seeking to 
limit their international liability rather than specifically curtail mercenarism.  
The features of domestic neutrality legislation draw out these points, and we take the United 
Kingdom’s Foreign Enlistment Act (FEA) 1870 as the exemplar.16 The illegality of foreign 
enlistment for the purposes of the Act is characterised upon; the absence of sovereign 
permission; acquiescence to participate in the armed forces of another State; and that State is 
at war with a State on friendly terms to the United Kingdom.17 Taken together, these features 
of the FEA imply that the United Kingdom is not legislating a broad repugnance of 
mercenarism (Committee of Privy Counsellors 1976, 7, para 24; the legal defects are detailed 
                                                 
13 Examples of precisely this situation is provided in the conflicts of the early 19th Century where private force 
was deemed acceptable in promoting liberal ideas against absolutist monarchs.   
14 Hague Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 
Land. 18 October 1907. 
15 Indeed, Percy (2007b, 115) herself criticises Thomson on this point in no uncertain terms; ‘To call neutrality 
laws “anti-mercenarism legislation” is misleading, because it suggests that states were using neutrality law with 
the purposeful intent of eradicating mercenaries’.  
16 33&34 Vict. Chapter 90, 9 August 1870. See below for a discussion of the debates surrounding the Act. 
17 Section 4. This and further Sections elaborate upon intention, or inducement of others, to join the armed 
forces of foreign States for similar purposes among restrictions of passage for such individuals.  
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at 7–10, paras. 26-39), but instead neatly curtails a very narrow category of private military 
activity. In essence, the Act only purports to restrict the embarkation of individuals who have 
designs to join the forces of a State engaged in conflict with States friendly to the United 
Kingdom. Important caveats exculpate the individual from the ambit of the Act; the 
permission of the sovereign, activities conducted outside of the armed forces of another State, 
and perhaps most significantly, if the martial objectives of the individual align with those of 
the United Kingdom and her allies.18 Thus, the FEA needs to be understood as protecting the 
vital strategic and economic interests of the United Kingdom.19 Thus, neutrality laws ensure 
that a State’s own nationals do not undermine its own or its allies’ interests through military 
activity. 
Restricting the embarkation of individuals, however, causes friction with the freedom of 
movement norm which, as enshrined in Article 12(2) of the ICCPR, explicitly encompasses 
the unqualified individual right to leave any country. While neutrality legislation goes well 
beyond the requirements imposed by the principle of non-intervention by stipulating 
proactive measures aimed at preventing entanglements in foreign conflicts, rather than merely 
dictate that the State is not to be involved in the organisation and deployment of the force, it 
remains bounded by the imperatives of the freedom of movement. The pervasiveness of this 
norm limits the justifiable incursions made by countervailing interests which in part account 
for the specificity exhibited by neutrality legislation. Nowhere is this more obvious than in 
the case of the UK government’s attempt to withdraw passports of individuals who wished to 
engage in, or who were returning from participating in, mercenary operations. While known 
mercenaries have had their passports withdrawn, notably in 1961, 1968 and 1974, such an 
approach was viewed as unlikely to be an effective deterrent and very difficult, if not 
impossible, to administer.20 Given the human rights dimensions of revoking an individual’s 
passport, it would have been a controversial move for Parliament that would have opened the 
government to criticism of implementing arbitrary restrictions upon travel (FCO 45/1889). As 
one parliamentarian objected to the Foreign Secretary that, ‘while (…) the grant[ing] or 
withdrawal of a passport is within the prerogative of the Foreign Secretary, this is a power 
that has been very rarely used, and should (…) be used only with the greatest of 
circumspection’ (FCO 45/1889). The same parliamentarian compared the practice with that 
of Communist countries that refused their citizens passports and which the UK government 
strongly deplored (FCO 45/1889).21 
A strong anti-mercenary norm would be expected to converge with the thrust of neutrality 
legislation to carve greater inroads against the individual right of free movement, but we find 
little supporting evidence. The overriding interest of States enacting neutrality legislation was 
to stay out of foreign wars, and not to restrict the flow of private military actors. Thus, despite 
numerous occasions on which the UK FEA 1870 could have been applied, it is telling that it 
                                                 
18 In the contemporary context, this alignment of PMSC contractors with the interests of Western powers may 
account for the relative ease with which the industry functions.  
19 This was the case after President Lincoln announced the Union’s intention to blockade the ports belonging to 
the Southern states in April 1861where upon the British government took the opportunity to proclaim its 
neutrality to protect important economic interests with both belligerent parties. See (Arielli, Frei, and Hulle 
2016, 7–11). 
20 See CAB 148/112, FCO 53/29, FCO 38/319 for details about why passports were withdrawn.  
21 For a brief commentary, see Percy 2007b, 195-98. 
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has never actually been relied upon in litigation.22 Thomson (1997, 84) had suggested that the 
increasing number of States imposing restrictions upon their citizenry in relation to foreign 
military service led directly to a decline in availability of armies for hire internationally, 
which in turn accounted for the observable decline in mercenarism. But as Percy (2007b, 112, 
quoting Avant 2000, 67, footnote 112) accurately observed, however, ‘[f]or Thomson to be 
right, “we should see countries trying to buy mercenaries and failing; but there is little 
evidence of this phenomenon”’. Thomson’s conclusion concerning the decline of 
mercenarism may have missed the mark, but it provides further evidence of the freedom of 
movement norm in play. That there is no evidence of supply shortages, combined with the 
fact that neutrality legislation is rarely, if ever, used in prosecutions together suggest that 
States were not concerned at restricting the outflow of their nationals to foreign conflicts. 
Furthermore, the freedom of movement norm created difficulties even for States which had 
an interest in suppressing the foreign military service of their nationals, which would account 
for the continuity in supply that Avant (2000, 67, footnote 112) observed. 
Normative Restrictions Imposed upon Receiving-States  
The existence of an anti-mercenary norm can more readily be deduced from the reaction of 
States upon whose territory these activities occur. The expectation is that receiving-States23 
will have a strong interest in minimising the adverse impacts of foreign military actors on the 
State’s domestic activities, and to do so by the means of deterrence and punishment. In this 
regard, recourse to the criminal law is unsurprising for the simple reason that many of the 
activities constituting mercenarism would independently satisfy domestic penal provisions. 
The drive for criminalising mercenarism is thus predictable, but arguably superfluous, 
because the legal tools for prosecution are largely in place. Indeed, while the status of being a 
mercenary and association with such individuals may arguably constitute aggravating factors, 
determining such status is both convoluted and controversial. The thrust of criminalisation 
initiatives, however, must necessarily remain confluent with State interests, and this 
constitutes a significant challenge for the existence of an anti-mercenary norm. Even States 
affected by mercenarism only prohibit very specific forms of mercenarism, generally leaving 
open the possibility for bolstering their own military ranks with mercenaries.24  
The influence of the right of peoples to self-determination, enshrined in Article 1(1) common 
to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and the prevailing notion in the 1960s and 1970s that 
mercenarism frustrated this process of decolonisation complicates this picture.25 The strength 
of the international norm of self-determination can be deduced by its prime position in the 
International Covenants. Thus, the implication is that the appearance of an anti-mercenary 
norm in this period may only be the mirage of the stronger right of self-determination. If this 
                                                 
22 See CAB 148/112, cabinet paper on the mercenary problem for a detailed explanation of the Foreign 
Enlistments Act 1870.   
23 Terminological note; ‘receiving’ does not imply consent or acquiescence, but instead reflects the actual 
presence or occurrence of mercenary activity on the territory of a State.  
24 Contract fighter pilots used by the Nigerian state during the Biafra war (FCO 65/362), for example. 
25 The British government’s policy towards Africa at the time was one of non-intervention and neutrality. The 
government may have feared foreign fighters becoming involved with the rebels in places like Rhodesia where 
the government was attempting peaceful transfer of power to majority rule. This accounts for government 
support for an international convention banning mercenary recruitment into rebel armies, while retaining State 
rights to recruit foreign fighters. See DEFE 24/1349 and DEFE 24/1759.   
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is the case, it should be possible to demonstrate that the objections to mercenarism go only as 
far as can be justified to prevent conflict with self-determination.  
The UN Economic and Social Council (1986/16) were explicit about the perceived threat 
mercenarism posed to self-determination in;  
Condemn[ing] the increased recruitment, financing, training, assembly, transit and use 
of mercenaries, as well as other forms of support to mercenaries (…) for the purpose 
of destabilizing and overthrowing the Governments of southern African States and 
fighting against the national liberation movements of peoples struggling for the 
exercise of their right of self-determination. (Emphasis added).  
The motivation to stymie mercenarism as a means of fostering the right of peoples to self-
determination is apparent in the Preamble of both international Conventions addressing 
mercenarism. In the Organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa (henceforth OAU Convention, OAU 1977), the Preamble speaks of 
‘the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries present to the independence, sovereignty, 
security territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of the 
Organization of African Unity’ and the ‘threat which the activities of mercenaries pose to the 
legitimate exercise of the right of African People under colonial and racist domination to their 
independence and freedom’. In a similar vein, the United Nations General Assembly (1989) 
was motivated by an awareness ‘of the recruitment, use, financing and training of 
mercenaries for activities which violate principles of international law such as those of 
sovereign equality, political independence, [and] territorial integrity of States and self-
determination of peoples’.26  
In subsuming mercenarism within the threat posed to the right of peoples to self-
determination and the political stability and territorial integrity of the State, the international 
legal position essentially adopts the status of mercenary as a heuristic: the mercenary is 
synonymous with insurrection and human rights violations. The image of the mercenary 
embodies disparate threats. As such, the label ‘mercenary’ possesses predominantly rhetorical 
value, which is engaged for its pejorative and stigmatising effect, and which operates as an 
aggravating factor that merits additional punishment. If this is correct, however, the objection 
to mercenarism is instrumental, and not intrinsic to the status, further eroding the claim of an 
independent anti-mercenary norm. 
The OAU and UN Conventions confirm the instrumental objection to mercenarism, and can 
be collapsed into the concern to safeguard the political stability of States and the right of 
peoples to self-determination.27 Article 1(2) of the OAU Convention (1977) stipulates that 
‘The crime of mercenarism is committed (…) with the aim of opposing by armed violence a 
process of self-determination stability or the territorial integrity of another State’ (see also, 
Ballesteros 2003, para. 39). Similarly, Article 2(a) of the UN Convention (UN General 
Assembly 1989) defines as a mercenary persons ‘specially recruited (…) for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at [o]verthrowing a Government or 
otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State (…) or [u]ndermining the territorial 
                                                 
26 Henceforth ‘UN Convention’. 
27 Neither instrument objects to mercenarism per se. 
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integrity of a State’.28 If mercenarism were universally objectionable on moral grounds and 
expressed as a specific international norm, the expectation would be that mercenaries and 
their associates would be unequivocally condemned for their intrinsic qualities, and without 
qualification.29 Yet, it is difficult to extract expressions of opposition to mercenarism where 
such activities are not directed at undermining the constitutional order or territorial integrity 
of States and which are unrelated to the right of peoples to self-determination. The most that 
can be concluded is that OAU and UN Conventions criminalise very narrow manifestations 
of mercenarism where these converge with the interests of national stability and the right of 
self-determination: as such, these constitute an expression of those norms. 
Further eroding the contention that mercenaries are morally objectionable is their legal 
definition as non-State actors. If the core mercenary characteristics are his motivation to fight 
by the desire for material gain, his foreign character in relation to the conflict, and his specific 
recruitment to fight in a particular conflict (van Deventer 1976, 813–14, summing up the 
definitional debates for Article 47 of API), it is not immediately obvious why he should 
suddenly be exculpated by alignment with the State.30 If the moral objection to the mercenary 
is intrinsic to his qualities, why should either the cause for which he fights or the status of his 
employer factor into the moral calculus?  
Along similar lines are the formalistic distinctions drawn by Article 47 of Additional Protocol 
I (henceforth API) governing international armed conflicts. As the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries Enrique Ballesteros (2003, para. 38) stated; ‘Given its nature as an instrument of 
international humanitarian law, the Protocol does not legislate on mercenaries themselves, 
but on their possible involvement in an armed conflict’.31 Yet, only mercenaries who 
participate in an international armed conflict suffer the disadvantage imposed by Article 47, 
which has no counterpart in Additional Protocol II that regulates non-international armed 
conflicts (Liu 2015). This differential treatment of mercenaries undercuts the claim of a 
strong and universal condemnation of mercenaries which would necessitate symmetrical 
treatment regardless of the status of the armed conflict. It should be observed that Article 47 
does evince some condemnation of mercenaries who were historically accorded prisoner-of-
war status upon capture (Kwakwa 1990, 85), with some reports even indicating that 
suspected mercenaries received preferential treatment (Cotton 1977, 151, note 44). Yet, this 
reversal of historical practices does not go as far as might be expected of a strong 
international norm because Article 47 merely denies mercenaries of the right to be a 
privileged combatant rather than denying that status outright (ICRC 1987, para. 1795). 
That international law proscribes mercenarism only in certain contexts and prohibits the use 
of mercenaries towards specified ends provides a strong challenge against the existence of a 
strong international norm against mercenarism. Percy (2007a) argues that the flaws pertaining 
to the international law on mercenaries evinces the faithfulness of States to the principles 
                                                 
28 Note that this definition is narrower than that in the OAU Convention, and that its concern is protecting the 
stability of the international order. 
29 It has proven extremely difficult to convincingly distinguish the mercenary on moral grounds. See Lynch and 
Walsh, 2000. 
30 Under the formalistic legal definition, a mercenary employed by a State is an oxymoron because this nexus 
would immediately exclude him from the purview of that definition.  
31 As such, like Percy’s (2007b, 115) own critique of Thomson’s identification of neutrality law as anti-
mercenary legislation, it would be inappropriate to characterise Article 47 of API as a measure deployed against 
mercenaries per se.  
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underpinning the anti-mercenary norm. A shallow challenge compares the low ratification 
rates32 for the broadly international UN Convention (UN General Assembly 1989)33 with the 
relatively high adoption rates for the regional OAU Convention (OAU 1977).34 This relative 
difference in uptake suggests that mercenarism was an important issue in the African context, 
where mercenaries were active and perceived to frustrate the right of peoples to self-
determination, but not for the broader international community.35 Our deeper challenge 
pertains to Percy’s (2007a, 381-86) assertion that it was the conflicting norm of State 
responsibility that caused State reluctance in the context of the UN Convention. It is unclear 
from the text of the UN Convention that it imposes criminal responsibility upon the State;36 
this is in clear contrast to the terms of the OAU Convention which provides for the possibility 
of a State itself committing the crime of mercenarism.37 Considering the broader international 
context of the law of State responsibility, a State is only responsible for internationally 
wrongful acts of non-State entities where that person or entity is ‘empowered by the law of 
that State to exercise elements of governmental authority’ or where ‘the person or group of 
persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default 
of the official authorities’.38 Taken together, the low international ratification rate espoused in 
the UN Convention indicates a certain level of apathy in relation to mercenary activities. The 
norm conflict to which this was attributed appears at closer inspection not to be applicable. 
The Historical Context of the International Conventions Against Mercenarism 
The international reaction to mercenaries was sparked by the United Nations experience in 
the Congo in 1961 (ICRC 1987, para. 1789). The UN, however, did not raise a moral 
objection to the mercenary activity, but rather focused upon the destabilising effects of 
foreign military personnel in the civil war. Thus, the focus of the Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR 161 1961) was ‘the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all 
Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel (…) not under United Nations 
Command, and mercenaries’,39 with ‘mercenaries’ seemingly inserted as an afterthought. But 
                                                 
32 The low ratification of the UN Convention by States, particularly Western States, might be explained as an 
outcome of the UN definition, which could affect persons wishing to serve in the armed forces of another 
country. While an exception was ultimately carved for individuals who are members of the armed forces of a 
party to the conflict, the potential curtailment of a State’s freedom of recruitment remained a significant 
concern. The UK was concerned about jeopardising access to Commonwealth countries and Ireland to fill the 
ranks of its armed forces. At the Geneva Conference, the British delegation was briefed to oppose any proposed 
definition of a mercenary which would include any member of an armed force under the control of the 
government. This insight might apply to other countries also seeking to protect their right to recruit foreign 
citizens into their military. See DEFE 24 17/59.                 
33 The ICRC database indicates 31 State parties and 14 State signatories.  
34 The ICRC database indicates 34 State parties and 9 State signatories.  
35 A minor point could also be made that a strong anti-mercenary norm would compel States to ratification, even 
if the Convention itself proved unwieldy or ineffective, to signal support for the position.  
36 Articles 2-4 stipulate offences for the purposes of the UN Convention related to persons. This suggests that 
the UN Convention establishes individual criminal responsibility for the activities stipulated within the 
document. While later Articles set forth State obligations under the UN Convention, these are phrased in terms 
of refraining from engaging directly with mercenarism, for establishing mechanisms for punishing the impugned 
actions, and for cooperation and coordination in these regards.  
37 Article 2 (OAU 1977) provides; ‘The crime of mercenarism is committed by the individual, group or 
association, representative of a State and the State itself (…)’. Emphasis added. 
38 Articles 5 and 8 respectively. UNGAR 56/83 2002. A/RES/56/83. 
39 Interestingly in the context of the previous section, this Resolution continued by urging States to prevent the 
departure of such personnel from their territories.  
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the focus of the UN on foreign military personnel indicates that the object of scorn is not the 
mercenary, but rather the interference of foreigners more broadly in a raging civil war.40   
The specific international legal provisions specifically targeting mercenaries was the 1976 
Luanda Trial in the wake of the Angolan civil war.41 This narrow historical and geographical 
context is critical because it questions whether the objection to mercenarism is generalisable, 
and generally acceptable, to the international community. A pointed problem persists, 
however, in the Luanda Trial itself in which the Angolan authorities were criticised for 
having prosecuted and convicted thirteen mercenaries without legal basis. 
George Lockwood (1976, 198-99), a Canadian member of ‘an International Commission of 
Enquiry on Mercenaries’ convened by the Angolan government to observe the trial, noted 
that the principal charge was the crime of being a mercenary, and yet ‘it would undoubtedly 
be difficult to argue convincingly that the crime of being a mercenary was part of the law of 
Angola’. After analysing Angola’s operative laws at the time of the Trial, Mike J. Hoover 
(1977, 340) concluded that substantive due process had been breached because there was no 
domestic legislation criminalising the impugned activities that the defendants were accused 
of committing. Hoover (1977, 339) concluded that ‘At the time of their arrests, the 
defendants had not violated existing Angolan law except arguably laws forbidding illegal 
entry, kidnapping, murder, and robbery. Callan and McKenzie were the only two charged 
with murder. None of the others was even charged with these crimes’.42 This led Hugh Byatt 
(1976), the official British observer, to condemn the Luanda trial as a show trial conducted 
for political purposes (see HC Deb, Vol 915, cc 44-9 for the British response).  
Robert Cesner, the chief defence council for the American defendants, and John Brant (1976, 
354-55) concurred, drawing attention to the additional support provided by the Draft 
Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism which recognised the need 
for legislation to control mercenary activity. They too highlight the problem of insufficient 
legal footing for the convictions, but also extrapolate to the peril ‘as to the propriety in 
following the mercenary trial as a legal precedent’ because no State ‘can create precedent by 
its own acts which are contrary to existing law’ (Cesner and Brandt 1976, 355). Implicit is 
their concern that the Luanda Trial will be heralded as a legal precedent for the criminal 
status of mercenaries and the criminalisation of mercenarism more broadly. While the 
Luanda Trial does not serve as direct precedent as such, it became the catalyst driving 
forward the conclusion of international agreements which curtailed the rights of mercenaries 
and which put mercenary activity on a criminal stance. To underscore the international legal 
position shortly after the conclusion of the Luanda Trial, the Diplock Report concluded that 
‘[t]o serve as a mercenary is not an offence under international law’. (Committee of Privy 
Counsellors 1976, 10).  
                                                 
40 UNSC Resolution 169 of the 24th November 1961 (S/5002) states as policies and purposes of the United 
Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) to include ‘(d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and 
evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United 
Nations Command, and all mercenaries’.   
41 The Luanda Trial was unique; a similar case concerning an acknowledged mercenary was undertaken in 
Sudan, but the trial proceeded upon specific violations of the law, Cesner and Brant 1976, 351–52. See also, 
Hoover 1977, 336–38. 
42 Indeed, the Luanda Trial and its outcome underscore the concern that mercenaries may in fact be vulnerable 
individuals in need of protection, Fraser 2013. 
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Situated within this context, the subsequent drive to criminalise mercenarism arguably seeks 
to compensate for the embarrassment sparked by the Luanda Trial by pushing for the 
development of a firm international legal basis for subsequent prosecutions. Yet, the 
distinctly African interest in pursuing this initiative is evident not only from the OAU 
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, but can also be deduced from the 
comparatively low ratification of the UN Mercenary Convention. The outgrowth of anti-
mercenarism sentiment from events at the conclusion of the Angolan civil war underscores 
the partial and parochial interests from which the international reaction blossomed.  
Historical Evidence: European Mercenarism during the First Half of the 19th Century  
We now turn to consider the historical evidence challenging the notion that an anti-mercenary 
norm is the outcome of moral objections to the mercenary. It is necessary at this point to 
reassert Riemann’s (2016) thesis that the mercenary is not a trans-historical figure, but rather 
an identity forged at the turn of the 19th century and tempered against the consolidation of the 
citizen army as the benchmark of organising violence. Our aim in the following sections is 
begin a process of reorienting mercenary discussions to the appropriate historical period in 
which the mercenary emerged as a distinct actor with stable and identifiable characteristics 
on the international stage.  
The archival and documentary evidence indicates the continued support for mercenaries 
among many United Kingdom parliamentarians during the first half of the 19th century. This 
support, however, was often tempered with the State’s need to remain neutral in times of 
war.43 From an instrumental perspective for objecting to mercenaries, a large section of the 
parliamentary evidence will show that if the interest of the home State was not affected by the 
desire of its citizens to wage war on behalf of another State, or revolutionary movement 
against another foreign State, then the citizen was free to follow such a course of action 
provided that such action converged with State interests. Only when there was misalignment 
of home State interest and the action of its citizens were objections triggered. Thus, while the 
parliamentary debates show mixed feelings towards mercenaries, many parliamentarians 
supported them provided they fought in the defence of liberty (Hansard HC Deb 13 May 
1819 vol 40 cc362-74; Hansard HC Deb 03 June 1819 vol 40 cc867-910; Hansard HC Deb 
10 June 1819 vol 40 cc1084-116; Hansard HC Deb 11 June 1819 vol 40 cc1118-25).44  
The focus on the role of the United Kingdom is justified because her national interests were 
global and, as in the case of secessionist movements in Southern Europe and South America, 
were often concerned with supporting liberal causes against absolute monarchies. As long as 
mercenaries fought in support of the former, the United Kingdom would not intervene 
(Rodriguez 2009, 409). As Dakin’s (1955) assessment of Greece makes clear, 
The Governments of France and England, far from looking with entire 
disfavour upon their nationals who went to Greece as volunteers, welcomed to 
                                                 
43 This was the reason the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Spain on the 5 
July 1814. See Hansard HC Deb 16 March 1815 vol 30 cc226-8. Also see Wentzell 2014. 
44 As many as 50,000 British North American’s enlisted in the Union Army many to fight in the cause of 
freedom. See Wentzell 2014  
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a certain extent their activities and certainly connived [with] them to an 
extraordinary degree.45           
Consequently, mercenaries played a vital role in advancing the liberal cause at a time when 
the United Kingdom was still recovering from the effects of the Napoleonic Wars. They 
were, in this respect, favoured over the use of regular soldiers by the government, even 
though there were Parliamentarians who disliked the whole idea of relying on them. This 
latter group supported the concept that ‘warfare [was] something that could only be 
honourably fought by someone with a personal stake in the matter’ according to Percy 
(2007b, 122). The shift away from mercenaries, therefore, cannot be interpreted solely in 
terms of a moral abhorrence against them, for while questions about their use were being 
asked in Parliament the evidence against them in favour of a citizen army is simply not 
conclusive enough.      
The most important event that shaped the United Kingdom’s attitude towards mercenaries in 
the first half of the 19th century, and which ultimately dictated the government’s response  to 
mercenary activity, was the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Spain (Hansard HC Deb 
16 March 1815 vol 30 cc226-8). The treaty effectively obliged the government to introduce 
the Foreign Enlistment Bill (Hansard HC Deb 13 May 1819 vol 40 cc362-74) that ‘[gave] the 
country the right that every legitimate country should have, to prevent its subjects from 
breaking the neutrality existing towards acknowledging states, and those assuming the power 
of states’. The Bill was introduced in 1819 but attempts were quickly made to repeal the Bill 
in 1823 and 1833. The reason in 1823 was because it was not thought necessary to protect the 
country’s neutrality in war (Hansard HC Deb 16 April 1823 vol 8 cc1019-58), and in 1833 
because according to Mr John Murray (Hansard HC Deb 06 August 1833 vol 20 cc381-9) 
‘there was never an Act of legislation so little in accordance with the general opinion of the 
country’. As Wentzell (2014, 62) points out, ‘his opinion was hardly unique’ among 
Parliamentarians. The final event we examine to understand the United Kingdom’s position 
on mercenaries during this period were the debates on the Enlistment of Foreigners Bill held 
in 1854 (HL Deb 14 December 1854 vol 136 cc253-91 253, HL Deb 15 December 1854 vol 
136 cc344-72 344, HL Deb 16 December 1854 vol 136 cc415-21 415, HC Deb 19 December 
1854 vol 136 cc507-618 507). It is at this point that parliamentarians began to morally object 
to the hiring of foreign soldiers. Their reasons, however, suggest little desire to establish an 
anti-mercenary norm. Instead, they point to the national interest lying at the heart of those 
objections, and in particular the need for a national army similar in size and design to the 
national armies of France and Prussia, according to Avant (Avant 2000).  
          
Returning to the House of Commons debates on the Foreign Enlistment Bill 1819, it is clear 
that support for the Bill was not unanimous (it passed the House of Commons by only 13 
votes, Wentzell 2014, 61) and there were strong objections to the idea of a prohibition on the 
purchase of mercenaries because it prevented British subjects who were disposed to fight in 
support of liberty, according to Mr Denman (Hansard HC Deb 03 June 1819 vol 40 cc867-
910). As Sir James Mackintosh (Hansard HC Deb 13 May 1819 vol 40 cc362-74) noted it 
was ‘a bill for preventing British subjects from lending their assistance to the South American 
cause, or enlisting in the South American service’; continuing, he also argued that the Bill 
was ‘an enactment to repress the rising liberty of the South Americans, and to enable Spain to 
re-impose that yoke of tyranny (…) which they had nobly shaken off, and from which, he 
trusted in God they would finally be enabled to free themselves’. Nor was Sir James 
                                                 
45 Quoted in Rodriguez 2009, 409.   
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Mackintosh alone in expressing such sentiments. Mr Ellice (Hansard HC Deb 13 May 1819 
vol 40 cc362-74), also supported ‘the cause and object of the people of South America’ who 
wished to free themselves from tyranny. Nevertheless, it was Colonel Davies (Hansard HC 
Deb 13 May 1819 vol 40 cc362-74) who in the end summarised the feelings of so many 
parliamentarians towards the Bill when he stated that,  
he was convinced that his [Honourable] friends who spoke against the 
measure, expressed the sentiments of nine-tenths of the people of the United 
Kingdom. Were we, whose boast it was to value freedom, and whose duty it 
was to extend its influence in every part of the globe, to sacrifice our character 
by restraining the efforts of those patriots in rescuing themselves from 
bondage imposed on them for centuries? If the real object was neutrality, let 
the restriction as they affect Spain, be repealed altogether, and let it be open to 
the people to give their service to whichever party they pleased. 
Such feelings as expressed against it did not disappear and as we mention above, two 
attempts were made to repeal the Bill in 1823 and 1833 because it was felt the law was 
unnecessary and unjust. In the first instance, such sentiment was expressed by Lord Althorp 
(Hansard HC Deb 16 April 1823 vol 8 cc1019-58) in the House of Commons debate in 1823 
when he argued that as long as no man acts to inconvenience or injure the community, and 
that he had proved on this account that the restriction was needless, then he had proved also 
that according to the principle of our free constitution, the Bill ought to be removed. In the 
second instance, some, such as Mr John Murray (Hansard HC Deb 06 August 1833 vol 20 
cc381-9) who moved to bring in a Bill to repeal the FEA, felt it to be unjust,   
because it was the natural right of every man, when his country did not want 
his service, or could not employ him, to carry his industry, his skill his talent, 
and his arms, into the service of a foreign country which might want his 
assistance. 
Finally, what of the Crimean War? It is only at this point that the debates on the Enlistment of 
Foreigners Bill take on a moral viewpoint. Importantly, however, it is not one based upon a 
general dislike for mercenaries since many chose to fight in defence of liberty in Southern 
Europe and South America after the Napoleonic Wars (Rodriguez 2009; Rodriguez 2006). 
The objection to using mercenaries was more closely related to their inappropriateness as a 
strategic tool to protect the country’s geostrategic interests, and not the idea that allowing 
Englishmen to fight by the side of mercenaries is bad for morale (Hansard HC Deb 19 
December 1854 vol 136 cc507-618). These objections were real concerns to 
parliamentarians, but they were also contested by those who supported the government’s 
decision to hire mercenaries to support its Crimean Campaign. Mr Adderley (Hansard HC 
Deb 19 December 1854 vol 136 cc507-618) summed up the first concern about their 
inappropriateness as a strategic tool in this situation by succinctly noting that, ‘such a 
measure could be only justifiable in the most urgent case of necessity’, and then pointed out 
that the urgent need to employ mercenaries had not been made. This position stands in stark 
contrast to Mr Watson (Hansard HC Deb 19 December 1854 vol 136 cc507-618), who 
supported the need to use mercenaries because he felt bound to support the government and 
‘if the government told him on their responsibility, sanctioned by the Commander-in-Chief, 
that the army required the support of foreign troops, not by substitution, but as auxiliaries, he 
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would at once give the government his support, and he felt that he would be backed by the 
whole people of England in so doing’. Finally on this point, Mr Watson (Hansard HC Deb 19 
December 1854 vol 136 cc507-618) also felt ‘that troops taken from Germany would be 
much sooner efficient troops than levies of English lads of eighteen or twenty’ a point 
supported by other parliamentarians. Strategic concerns guided Parliament’s decision to use 
mercenaries.  
What then of the other objections? Numerous parliamentarians felt that hiring German 
mercenaries was unacceptable: not fighting to the right reason, they were thought to abandon 
their post immediately when danger arose. Such objections, however, do not touch the 
essential characteristics of mercenarism. Rather the lynchpin of the grievance is whether the 
cause pursued is just.46 As other parliamentarians argued, the Crimean War was a European 
war, not a solely British and French war, and therefore all Europeans had just cause to fight 
Russia. As Lord Russell (Hansard HC Deb 19 December 1854 vol 136 cc507-618) explained, 
‘what we have always contended for in this House, and what I believe this House concurred 
in (…) is that we have embarked in a great European quarrel for the sake of the liberties of 
Europe’ (…) in which every German, every Swiss, and every other inhabitant of Europe 
ought to take as great an interest as any Englishman’. Thus, many in Parliament believed it 
was acceptable to hire German mercenaries because German citizens had as great an interest 
in pursuing the war as any Englishman. Various parliamentarians also felt such mercenaries 
posed a moral hazard to British soldiers who would not want to fight next to them.47 This was 
the position held by the Earl of Ellenborough (Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1854 vol 136 
cc253-91) who argued that ‘you are to some extent endangering [their] moral character by 
placing beside them, and in connection with them, troops for whose moral character you have 
no security’.48 He (Hansard HC Deb 14 December 1854 vol 136 cc253-91) did not mean to 
say that German troops hired as mercenaries did not make respectable soldiers under good 
officers, but that they were not equal to British and French soldiers. His position, however, 
was fiercely contested by others who sought to protect the reputation of foreign soldiers. 
Notable among them was the Duke of Richmond and the Earl of Derby (Hansard HC Deb 14 
December 1854 vol 136 cc253-91) who both felt that those who had served in the King’s 
German Legion during the last war did so with equal distinction to any British soldier. 
Beamish concurred, highlighting the loyalty, bravery and effectiveness of the Legion and 
stating that, ‘The King’s German Legion was without doubt amongst the very best troops 
commanded by Wellington in the Peninsula and at Waterloo’ (Beamish 1832-37). The idea 
that mercenaries were unworthy soldiers who presenting a moral hazard to the citizen soldier 
was simply untrue by the time of the Crimean War. The debate instead was more nuanced, 
with many parliamentarians continuing to embrace the good mercenary in part because of the 
strategic and economic benefits they conferred. 
                                                 
46 For the argument that ‘There is no reason to believe that there cannot be mercenaries who only participate in 
just wars’, see Lynch and Walsh 2000, 141. 
47 Such opinions as held by parliamentarians often did not reflect the opinions held by many British officers and 
soldiers who had served with Prussian and Austrian troops in particular. See Wishon 2013. 
48 Lord Ellenborough was a keen supporter of organising a militia to supply the army with the recruits it needed, 
instead of relying on foreign soldiers. Empirically, there is no basis to Ellenborough’s statement, which 
probably had more to do with his attempt at politicking to gain an advantage over the government. Beamish 
(1832-37) has documented the bravery of German troops who served under Wellington. 
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Those arguing in favour of an anti-mercenary norm often overlook the full picture about 
mercenary activity during the 19th Century: the mercenaries fighting against absolute powers 
in the wars of succession and civil wars in Southern Europe and South America (Rodriguez 
2009; Rodriguez 2006); the 50,000 who joined the Union Army; those who fought in defence 
of the Papal State, and in the ten year War in Cuba (1868-1878) (Wentzell 2014) come to 
mind. Our claim is not that moral objections did not exist or that they were not valid during 
this period, but rather that such objections were subordinated to political, strategic and 
economic interests. As the evidence above points out, Parliamentarians offered three 
different, but convincing, opinions in favour of allowing mercenary activity to continue. First, 
it was unjust to deny them employment. In this respect, an individual had a right to serve in 
the forces of a foreign government, provided that such service did not compromise the 
neutrality of his country. Second, mercenaries were an effective strategic tool for promoting 
national interests at minimum financial cost to the government (Mohlin 2012). Third, 
prohibiting them through an Act of Parliament was unnecessary provided that they did not 
harm the national interest. As the next section examines, it was not until mercenaries started 
to undermine the right of peoples to self-determination that objections to mercenary 
interventions began to take hold among member states of the international community.                                                                          
Documentary Evidence: Mercenary Activity in the Civil Wars of Yemen, the Congo and 
Angola (1962-1976) 
As we argue in the introduction, the notion of an anti-mercenary norm is anchored upon 
specific historical periods and geographical regions, and this is particularly evident in the 
case of the Cold War, with Africa from 1960-1976 as the intellectual focus.  
This final section challenges the factual basis of this focus by examining newly identified 
archival material about mercenary activity during the Cold War for the first time, as well as 
re-examining other documentary evidence. A complex picture emerges where governments 
use mercenaries to support their national interests on the one hand, but condemn them on the 
other hand if their activities fail to align with national interests. These interests were either 
narrowly focused on preserving influence in a region, or widely focused on the promotion of 
international norms as in the case of non-intervention. Unfortunately, in the context of 
mercenary activity, these norms often collided with each other, leaving governments’ 
discretion to choose depending on the exigencies of each particular context.  
Yemen 
One of the least discussed mercenary operations concerning the anti-mercenary norm is the 
mercenary operation in the Yemen from 1962-65, which Percy (2007b) completely ignores. 
To date, the only academic book that gives a concise account of the operation from the UK 
government’s perspective is Jones’s Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965 (2004). It is 
difficult to account for the near absence of this civil war from the literature, but one reason 
may be that little is known about it. A more plausible explanation is one of framing: how we 
conceive of mercenaries and what we imagine a mercenary to be like.  Consequently, the 
Yemeni mercenaries stood in opposition to the general conception of ‘the mercenary’ and 
hence were not recognised as such. They may have been airbrushed out of the anti-mercenary 
norm debate because their purpose, behaviour and motives do not correspond with the 
stereotypical image of the mercenary epitomised by the Congo and Angola operations during 
the 1960s and 1970s.     
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The first point to note about the Yemeni mercenary operation is who organised it and why. 
The operation was organised by members of the British government, whose intentions 
differed significantly to those who organised the mercenary operations in the Congo and 
Angola. The organisers were, to quote Jones (2004, 5), ‘individuals associated with 
influential pressure groups, both inside and outside government, [who] were, at crucial 
stages, able to usurp the recommendations of the mandarins in King Charles Street’. These 
individuals included, in particular, Julian Amery, who became Minister for Aviation and was 
Harold Macmillan’s son-in-law, and Lt Colonel Neil ‘Billy’ McLean.49 When the overthrow 
of Yemeni’s Imamate, with the support of Nasser, threatened to spill over into the Federation 
of South Arabia, they believed the future prosperity of Britain was now threatened by 
Nasser’s hegemonic ambitions and that it also served to strengthen Moscow’s hand in the 
region. Amery, McLean and their supporters acted to undermine any attempt by the 
government to recognise the new socialist government in Sana’a, a recognition strongly 
advocated by the Foreign Office (Jones 2004, 19). Instead, they chose to support a mercenary 
operation to protect what they saw as a national interest in maintaining Britain’s influence in 
the region against an expansionist Egypt. Bernard Mill (in Jones 2004, 4), a former Special 
Forces officer who took part in the mercenary operation, succinctly summed up the reasons 
behind this course of action: 
At this particular time (…) British governments had lost the will in some ways 
to engage in this sort of [clandestine] operation and we could do something the 
British government no longer had the will to do, help to get rid of a foreign 
power in Yemen. So it was logical for private enterprise to pick up this 
particular bill, particularly as we felt it was important for the British national 
interest. (Emphasis added).                                            
The last sentence is particularly revealing and leads us nicely into the second point, which is 
what motivated the mercenaries to participate and how they behaved. As Mill explained, both 
their intentions and their actions differed from those of the mercenaries who operated in the 
Congo and Angola. First, their goal was not just monetary but rather to protect Britain’s 
interests in the region (also see Smiley and Kemp 1975, 155). Secondly, they were 
handpicked and usually Special Forces trained, while those who served in the Congo and 
Angola were recruited via adverts in newspapers and often lacked the military discipline and 
training. The other reasons for choosing mercenaries were to do with the ‘legacy of Suez 
[which] imposed severe limitations on the extent to which Britain could resort to the overt 
use of force’ (Jones 2004, 86), in the region, and the government’s inability to generate a 
force quickly enough using either Special Forces or agents.  
Condemnation of mercenaries is usually based on the mercenary’s financial motivation and 
his lack of moral justification for killing.50 These objections did not necessarily apply with 
the Yemeni mercenary operation because civil servants, Ministers, parliamentarians and 
private individuals inside and outside government took diverging views on the merit of using 
mercenaries for the operation. Some thought it was the only viable option if UK vital interests 
were to be protected, while others took the opposite view, in that the operation was unlikely 
to change the situation on the ground in favour of UK in the long-term. Hence, a strong 
                                                 
49 The operation, though, did not receive official UK or French government support. See CAB 148/112. 
50 For a sustained challenge to even these objections. See Lynch and Walsh 2000. 
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objection to using mercenaries, particularly from the FCO, was met with equally strong 
support for the idea. Moreover, given the diverging views expressed on the Yemeni 
operation, it is hard to argue that mercenary operations per se are vilified. Even the Israeli 
government lent support to the mercenaries, and in exchange gained valuable intelligence 
about the capability and limitations of Egypt’s air force that proved invaluable during the 
1967 war (Hart-Davis 2012, 157, 328–29). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also benefitted from the 
operation in that Nasser’s reputation and influence on the Arabian Peninsula was severely 
damaged, and he no longer posed a real threat to British interests in the region. Ultimately, 
motivation and justification are important factors in evaluating the morality of using 
mercenaries. Focusing upon pecuniary motivation collapses the complexity of the 
relationship between the mercenary and government, the purposes behind that relationship, 
and the interests it is designed to protect, thereby oversimplifying the analysis.       
Thus, the final section examines this relationship its transformation to hostility when 
purposes and interests diverge. To contextualise this situation, we analyse the impact of 
mercenaries on the struggles for independence in the Congo and Angola, the two conflicts at 
the root cause of our contemporary objection to mercenaries.  
Unlike their early 19th Century predecessors, who fought in defence of freedom with the tacit 
approval of the governments of British and France, the mercenaries that plagued Africa 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s fought in frustration of the consolidating right of 
peoples to self-determination. Simultaneously, the majority of narratives over the last fifty 
years are overly simplistic, failing to grasp the political and strategic complexities and 
purposes behind the use of mercenaries by different governments and political movements in 
the Congo and Angola. The consequence is that most explanations of contemporary 
mercenary phenomena are too focused on particular events. These explanations also lack 
credibility by failing to explicate the precise reasons behind why mercenaries became 
embroiled in the Congo and Angola. In particular, most explanations ignore the interests of 
the Superpowers, some European governments and the newly established Congolese 
government which the mercenaries helped to secure. Thus, while these governments 
publically objected to the presence of these mercenaries, they often supported their presence 
privately because they directly benefitted from these activities.51  
Congo 
The presence of mercenaries in the Congo from 1961 to 1968 cover three distinct periods, 
during which time they were accused of destabilising the country, helping to save it from the 
Simba Revolt, and finally rebelling against Mobutu’s government. The literature, however, is 
focused on their role in helping the attempted Katangese secession from the Congo from 
1961 to 1963.52 This period ignited the international community’s condemnation towards the 
modern mercenary, who was seen to support Tshombe and his ambition for an independent 
Katanga; an ambition that probably received the support of the Union Minière,53 which some 
alleged financing of the mercenaries (Mockler 1985, 80–81). Such ambition was contrary to 
                                                 
51 A paper prepared on the mercenary problem in 1970 by the FCO indicated strong arguments on both sides of 
the debate. See CAB 148/112.       
52 Indeed, the Commentaries to API note that “The problem of mercenaries was first raised at the United Nations 
in 1961 in connection with the Katangese secession”, ICRC 1987, 572. 
53 The Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) was a Belgian mining company operating in Katanga It was 
created on October 28, 1906. 
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US policy which tied US support to the Adoula government and to Katangan reintegration 
(Foreign Relations of the United State, 1964-1968, Volume XXIII, Congo 1960-1968, United 
States Government Printing Office, Document 119). The US government were so concerned 
with the situation in Katanga that it seriously considered assigning troops to United Nations 
Operation Congo (UNOC) unless Katanga agreed to terms with the Congolese government 
and submit to UN decisions (Ibid). As the following telegram from US Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk to the US Embassy in Belgium pointed out ‘not only is Congo key to central 
Africa, but also chronic instability provides fertile grounds for Communist infiltration, 
prevention of which has been cornerstone our Congo policy last four years’ (Ibid, Document 
197). It is not surprising therefore that mercenaries became entangled with US interests, 
given the role they played in the Katangese attempt at independence. While it was also seen 
as an expression of the right to self-determination, the US fear was that the Congo could 
become communist-aligned, and might trigger a cascade, making an independent Congo the 
US’s principal interest in the region. Nor is it surprising that the reputation of the Congolese 
mercenaries as imperial lackeys working for the highest bidder was sealed given their support 
to such a venture.  
Then, in one of the most extraordinary twists in the politics of the Congo, Tshombe, after 
being appointed Prime Minister of the Congo in June 1964, immediately invited the 
mercenaries back to help put down a Simba Revolt54 in the eastern part of the country. As 
Michaels points out, it was ‘at the instigation of Washington and Brussels, [that] Tshombe 
began hiring a mercenary force to bolster the ANC’s counter-insurgency efforts’ (Michaels 
2012, 134). In public, the US government sought to distance itself from the mercenaries due 
to concerns about the damaging implications of possible press reports that the US was 
helping mercenaries kill Africans in order to protect European interests (Michaels 2012, 138-
39). Meanwhile privately, the relationship that eventually emerged was covert and effective, 
with CIA analysts lavishing praise upon Mike Hoare in particular (Michaels 2012, 138-139). 
Ultimately, the mercenary operation was a success that helped to ensure the Congo remained 
within the Western sphere of influence. Even so, Tshombe remained unpopular among the 
other African leaders because of his use of white mercenaries (Michaels 2012, 149), many of 
whom came from South Africa and Rhodesia and were considered to have very conservative, 
even colonialist political sympathies (Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 511). 
He was eventually replaced as Prime Minister making it easier for Congo’s neighbours to 
drop their support for the rebels.  
Then, on July 4th 1967 approximately 160 white mercenaries, along with Katangese troops, 
mutinied, causing a political headache for Mobutu’s government and the governments 
involved in their evacuation. Even so, some UK government departments still did not think 
mercenaries in general posed a serious long term threat to the country’s interests. As Dale 
from the FCO’s South East Asia Department noted ‘our interest in the subject is marginal; the 
problem of mercenaries in South East Asia is not itself serious enough to warrant legislation’ 
(FCO 53/29 (13)). These sentiments were echoed in other departments that thought the 
problem should be dealt with on a geographical basis (FCO 53/29 (11) (12) (13)). In another 
                                                 
54 The Simba Revolt began in the Congolese Eastern province of Kwilu and lasted from December 1963 to 
November 1965, organised and led by Pierre Mulele, Gaston Soumialot, and Christophe Gbenye. The Simba 
threat to Tshombe’s government gained the support of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, thus fuelling the 
perception in Washington that a Vietnam-style domino effect was likely to succeed in the region if the revolt 
continued. See Michaels 2012, 134.  
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FCO communication from the Central African Department the Legal Advisers made it clear 
that in order to show a need for legislation it was necessary to show the mercenary problem 
was not simply a Congolese problem (FCO 53/68).  
The question of whether to legislate against mercenaries climaxed with the release of OPDO 
(70) 1 paper on the mercenary problem by the FCO on the 5th January 1970 (CAB 148/112). 
The paper concluded that new legislation to deal with the problem would be controversial, 
unlikely to be effective, potentially embarrassing to administer, but attractive externally, 
ultimately concluding against legislative action at that time (CAB 148/112). The paper was 
later discussed by the Cabinet Working Party on Powers to Control the Recruitment of 
Mercenaries and the Export of Goods and Services on the 18th May 1970 (CAB 130/458). 
The Chairman’s opening statement acknowledged the committee’s general endorsement of 
the paper’s conclusion to the effect that new legislation to control the recruitment of 
mercenaries was unlikely to be advantageous (CAB 130/458). Finally, the government’s 
reluctance to contemplate new legislation banning mercenarism was therefore based on the 
idea that such legislation would be ineffective and at the same time act to limit the rights of 
the individual (FCO 25/111 (14)), and not moral opprobrium concerning mercenary 
motivation or conduct.  
Angola 
Angola sealed the fate of the mercenary as someone who could not be trusted to safeguard the 
interests and values of their home state. Many in the UK expected that the government would 
restrict or ban the profession after the evacuation of the Congo mercenaries. Yet, there was a 
‘marked lack of interest about the subject in Whitehall except on the part of the then Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson and Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend’ (FCO 46/556 (19A)). The 
government’s view then, was that the ‘balance of advantage was against further legislation at 
the present time’ (FCO 46/556 (19A)). After the Angola debacle, however, it might have 
been expected that the government would change tack and restrict or ban mercenaries. But 
even after numerous discussions between the same government departments that were 
involved with resolving the Congo mercenaries debacle, the government still chose to do 
nothing. This should not be surprising given that little had changed legally and contextually 
regarding the mercenary question since the evacuation of the Congo mercenaries in 1968. 
Furthermore, the arguments against banning mercenaries put forward then were still 
considered relevant by the government in 1976-77.  
The main report into the issue this time was the Diplock Report (Committee of Privy 
Counsellors 1976). The report was discussed at a meeting held by the Group on the 
Diplomatic Report on Mercenaries on the 20th July 1976 where it was agreed by the Group 
‘that the main recommendations of the report (points 6 and 7 of the summary of the 
conclusions) should be recommended to Ministers’ (CAB 164/1373(8)). However, it was also 
noted that both recommendations should be read in conjunction with sections 13 and 14 of 
the report, but in particular the first paragraph of section 13, which records the three 
propositions to which the committee attach most weight; ‘that it is not practicable or just to 
try and define an offence of enlistment as a mercenary by reference to motive; that a penal 
prohibition on what an individual does abroad involves a restriction of liberty which could be 
justified only on compelling grounds of national interests; and that the practical difficulty of 
providing such an offence would mean that there could be very few successful prosecutions’ 
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(CAB 164/1373 (13)). Furthermore, in the case of withdrawing a passport as an 
administrative means of controlling the movement of mercenaries it was considered 
unjustifiable and ‘needed to be considered in a wider context than that of the enlistment of 
mercenaries’ (CAB 164/1373 (10, Annex 3)). It was also noted that ‘it was something 
[removing a passport] which they would not wish to rely on in the future’ (CAB 164/1373 
(8)).  
Finally, the government’s attitude towards the Angolan mercenaries need to be contextualised 
in relation to its Southern African foreign policy because this accounts for why geo-
strategically the UK government was strongly opposed to the mercenary intervention. Unlike 
the Yemen operation, which had unofficial support from members of the government, this 
group of mercenaries were recruited largely as a result of a private initiative financed by the 
CIA and without Whitehall knowledge or acquiescence (Hughes 2014, 8-10). Furthermore, 
Whitehall officials felt that ‘any embroilment alongside Washington DC and Pretoria would 
be counterproductive for Western interests’ (Hughes 2014, 10). This was particularly so for 
the UK, which at the time was trying to negotiate an end to the Rhodesian civil war. 
Furthermore, Whitehall recognised that support for a CIA backed mercenary operation might 
provoke the Soviets to support the three liberation movements fighting the Smith regime. 
Such a move would not only undermine Whitehall’s political initiatives to end the war 
peacefully, but might lead to the Soviets competing with the UK over geostrategic interests 
and influence in the region. From the perspective of the UK government, it therefore did not 
make geo-strategic sense to support the mercenaries.  
Conclusion 
Despite the observable decline of mercenarism coinciding with an apparent repugnance 
expressed by the international community, we have interwoven theoretical explanations with 
empirical evidence, that demonstrate inconsistencies with the notion that a strong 
international norm exists against mercenaries. In challenging Percy’s argument, we have 
deliberately focussed upon the historical periods and events that she and other proponents of 
the anti-mercenarism norm have based their claim in order to illustrate other catalytic factors 
that do not turn upon a mercenary-specific norm. We have then supplemented these accounts 
with largely overlooked historical episodes from the literature because we believe they failed 
to fit the image of mercenary activity, but which further erode support for an international 
norm against mercenarism. 
While we do not discount moral objections to mercenaries completely, the revised picture 
becomes one that is dominated by the primary tones of neutrality in the international arena, 
the right of peoples to self-determination, and the narrow interests of States during periods of 
international instability, with the UK as the lead example. We have sought to demonstrate 
that the expression of these factors can account for much of the observations put forward by 
the proponents of the anti-mercenarism norm, and we suggest the anti-mercenary norm is not 
as strong as its supporters suggest and, moreover, is often marginalised when national 
interests diverge from its tenets.  
Given the widely accepted difficulties of defining a mercenary, the lack of international 
support for the instruments that curtail mercenarism, and the persistence of private military 
services proffered for profit in contemporary conflicts, we present this body of evidence to 
ground a broad reappraisal of the purported anti-mercenarism norm. In so doing, we hope to 
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reopen the question of mercenary decline for investigation and to foster different perspectives 
that seek to account for the observed trends. Finally, there is the question of continued 
relevance for the purported mercenary-specific norm, when considered in the context of new 
developments such as the emerging foreign fighters debate. By advancing a broader 
framework that accounts for international reaction to privately organised armed actors more 
generally, we hope to sketch the contours for further research beyond the mercenarism 
phenomenon. As such, we hope that this article has re-opened this area for a broader and 
more comprehensive debate that takes into account contemporary developments.  
